Recently group-oriented applications over unsecure open networks such as Internet or wireless networks have become very popular. Thus, group communication security over unsecure open networks has become a vital concern.
Introduction to group key establishment protocols
The establishment of a common secret key between the members of a group over an open unsecure network is vital to satisfy secure communication requirements. The confidentiality of the communication between members of a group requires sharing a common ephemeral key to use in the encryption and decryption of communication data. For this purpose, there are two group key establishment (GKE) protocols: group key agreement (GKA), a protocol whereby the parties jointly establish a common secret, and group key distribution (GKD), a protocol whereby one of the parties creates or obtains a secret value and then securely distributes it to other parties.
The first security drawback of both methods is the lack of authentication. For this reason, an active adversary can compromise the communication of legitimate parties by the use of a "man in the middle attack". The second security drawback is the lack of confidentiality and integrity checking during the protocol execution.
Authentication is generally based on long-term keys, which can be associated with identities. There are two main approaches to provide authentication: public key infrastructure (PKI) and identity based (ID-based) infrastructure. However, ID-based cryptography has two important disadvantages. First, it suffers from the key escrow problem since the private key generator generates private keys of entities using its master secret key. Second, it requires a secure channel to distribute generated private keys to participants. In this study:
(i) The GKA original protocol model is based on Lin et al.'s multiparty key agreement protocol [1] . Our contribution is the usage of a digital signature in order to provide message integrity checking and authentication between the users with a PKI solution.
(ii) The GKD original protocol model is based on Feldman's verifiable secret sharing (VSS) key distribution protocol [2, 3] . Due to nature of the VSS protocol, there is a secure channel requirement. We propose the usage of PKI, encryption, and signature schemes, which are realized in the execution of protocol over unsecure public networks.
In this article, we analyze and compare the communication and computation costs of these two GKE protocol models with and without our contribution (i.e. authentication and integrity checking). Section 2 presents the notations and specifications of the implemented protocols. In Section 3, the construction of GKA and GKD protocols is examined with their implementation results and security and efficiency analyses with and without our contributions. Finally, Section 4 presents the results of the efficiency analysis and implementation of the GKE protocols.
Notations, assumptions, and specifications of implemented protocol models

Notations used in the implementation of protocol models
The common notations of both protocol implementations are:
• n is the number of participants in the group.
• U i is a participant of group, U i ∈ {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n , i = 1, .., n .
• Cert i = {ID i, Y i is the certificate of U i and its long-term public key is Y i , and the unique numeric identifier is ID i, . Cert i is signed by the certification authority (CA).
• H is an SHA-512 secure hash function.
The specific notations of key agreement protocol are:
• A bilinear map e : G p × G p → G T between the two groups G p and G T as long as a variant of the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption is hard on G p .
• p is the prime number.
• P is the generator of additive group G p .
• K is the common secret key.
• a i is the long-term private key randomly chosen by U i .
• Y i is the long-term public key computed Y i = a i P by the related party U i .
• x i is the short-term (ephemeral) secret key randomly chosen by U i .
• T i and X i are public messages.
• Public parameters are param = ⟨G p , G T , e, p, P, H⟩.
The specific notations of key distribution protocol are:
• Primes q and psuch that q | (p − 1), and a generator g ∈ Z * p is an element of order q .
• s is common secret that will be shared.
• L is a leader who shares the common secret s among the n participants.
• t is the threshold value, according to Shamir's (t, n) secret sharing scheme.
• C is the commitment vector including different t DLog commitments;
• ( sig 1 sig 2 ) is signature pair and (
is an ElGamal encryption pair.
• Public parameters are param = ⟨q, p, g, H⟩.
Assumptions used in the implementation of protocols
• Before the protocol starts, every party U i generates his/her Cert i = { ID i, Y i } from a CA and these certificates of users have already been exchanged between group participants.
• The protocol works over an open unsecure channel forming a secure, closed communication group of participants. The members of the group are called reliable; they do not leak secret information outside of the group, and they send the correct messages defined by the protocol. All participants agree to follow the protocol.
Specifications of the implemented protocols
For key agreement protocol:
• The protocol models use the broadcast communication model.
• For each run of the protocol, there is one among n parties, which works as a leader L and starts the protocol specifying the static group number.
For key distribution protocol:
• The protocol needs two constant rounds, namely sharing and reconstruction, with n parties who participate in the establishment of the common secret and a leader L who shares the common secret s and commitments C among the n participants.
• There is a threshold value, which means that more than t shared subsecret values can be used to reconstruct the common secret generated by the leader. The relation between the threshold t and n is ≥ ( 2t + 1 ) [4, 5] .
Implementation of GKA and GKD protocols
A more detailed documentation and numeric examples of these implementations were presented in [6] .
The common implementation environment
Both algorithms are implemented for a small group of users as U i , i = 1, .., 4 . ANSI C is preferred as the programming language and the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) Library (http://gmplib.org/) is chosen for multiple precision calculations, while the OpenSSL Library (http://www.openssl.org/) is used for SHA-512 (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips). The Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) Library (http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/) is used for the pairing map and elliptic curve calculations are used for the key agreement protocol. The configuration of the machine is an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.0 GHz CPU, 4 GB RAM, and Ubuntu 12.10 operating system.
Security contributions to the GKA protocol
In this study, the communication among reliable participants satisfies the confidentiality via pairing-based cryptography and identification, integrity, and nonrepudiation via the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) short signature scheme [7, 8] .
Security contributions to the GKD protocol
The protocol is transformed into a feasible form to apply over an open-unsecure channel by adding encryption and signature algorithms. In this study, the communication between reliable participants satisfies the confidentiality via cryptographic structures such as the ElGamal encryption algorithm and satisfies the identification, integrity, and nonrepudiation via the ElGamal signature scheme [9] . To improve the security level of the implementation, ElGamal encryption and signature schemes can be implemented by different group structures or schemes as indicated in [10, 11] .
Implementation and efficiency analysis of GKA protocol
Setup: This is an offline task and numeric values of input and setup parameters are calculated by use of the PBC Library. E is a super singular curve defined by y 2 = x 3 +x over F q and P ∈ E/F q is a 1024-bit generator.
The Weil pairing on the curve E / F q 2 is a mapping:
number where h is a multiple of 12 and p is 160-bit prime number. Each U i should have static public Y i as a 1024-bit and private a i as a 160-bit key pair where Y i =a i P . Now the protocol can be started by leader L . Here the process of the protocol is given in two sections as "GKA -protocol steps" and "GKA -protocol steps with contributions" as depicted in Figures 1 and 2 , respectively.
GKA protocol steps as depicted in Figure 1
The leader L from set U announces the public parameters param = ⟨ G p , G T , e, p, P, H⟩ and the group number n . Then the first round starts. 
Round 2 -Step 3:
Each user calculates the common key:
[ (a n + a n x n ) × (a 1 + a 1 x 1 ) × (a 2 + a 2 x 2 ) + (a 1 + a 1 x 1 ) × (a 2 + a 2 x 2 ) × (a 3 + a 3 x 3 ) + . . . + (a n−1 + a n−1 x n−1 ) × (a n + a n x n ) × (a n+1 + a n+1 x n+1 )
] .
Furthermore, the common shared secret key is then obtained by the key derivation function algorithm-kdf , which is simultaneously used to calculate the common secret by each U i (http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsalabs/standards-initiatives/pkcs-5-password-based-cryptography-standard.html).
GKA protocol steps with contributions as depicted in Figure 2
Round 1 -Step 1: Each user calculates and signs T i and sends Sig i (T i ) to all users for identification and integrity checking, and at the same time verifies all received Sig i (T i ) . In implementation, each user generates a digest value of T i by H i = SHA − 512(T i ) . Then U i signs the H i value with his static private key a i by using the BLS short signature scheme. Here the BLS output is a point on E / F q with 1024-bit length.
Each user U i also verifies received Sig i (T i ) by calculating H i and checking that e(Sig i (T i ), P ) = e(H i Y i ). If the result of the function is equal, then Sig i (T i ) is verified.
Round 2 -Step 2:
Each user does pairing operation to generate, sign, and broadcast the message Sig i (X i ) and verify all received Sig i (X i ) by these calculations:
The verification of the received U i 's signatures and integrity checking of X i are satisfied by calculation of H i = SHA − 512(X i ) and checking the equality of e (Sig i (X i ) , P ) = e(H i Y i ) .
Round 2 -Step 3:
Each user simultaneously calculates the common key K as described in Step 3 of Section 3.4.1. This step does not require any security contribution.
Observations and efficiency analysis of GKA
In light of both implementation results of the protocol, the total efficiency costs in terms of computation, communication, and round complexities including the whole parties during Round 1 and Round 2 are available in Table 1 and Table 2 , respectively. Table 1 . Implementation results of GKA-based steps.
GKA -protocol steps Computational cost (ms)
Communication cost (bits) Round • As seen from these results (Tables 1 and 2) , only the computational cost is affected by security contributions and its computational complexity increases from a constant to a linear class. On the other hand, the communication cost grows twice but it already belongs to the same linear complexity class due to the used signature scheme. Different signature schemes can add different space costs.
Implementation and efficiency analysis of GKD protocol -VSS
Setup: This is an offline task of the protocol. The numeric values of input and setup parameters are calculated by using the GMP Library. The p is a 1024-bit prime number and g is a 1024-bit primitive root of Z * p . The q is a 512-bit prime number, where q | (p − 1). For each user U i and leader we have a (1024-bit) static private key
x i ∈Z * p , and (1024-bit) static public key Y i where Y i = g xi (mod p) and Cert i = ( Y i , ID i ) , which is exchanged before the protocol starts. Now the protocol can be started by one of the group participants, called leader L. Here the process of the protocol is presented in two sections as "GKD -protocol steps" (Figure 3) and "GKD -protocol steps with contributions" (Figure 4) .
Leader − #1 The Leader generates , and then sends and to each #2 Each verifies received with received and send own verified to all other users except Leader. #3 VerificaƟon of subsecrets that are received from other users is done by using . #4 Each calculates common key by Lagrange InterpolaƟon 
GKD protocol steps as presented in Figure 3
Round 1 -Sharing phase
Leader L announces the public parameters ⟨⟩param = q, p, g, H and the group number n. Here n = 4 and t = ⌈ (n − 1) / 2 ⌉ = 2, which defines the second-degree polynomial f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + a 2 x 2 (mod q) .
In this polynomial, a 0 , a 1 , a 2 ∈ Z q are randomly selected constants of polynomial, and a 0 would like to be shared among the four participants as common secret key s. The commitment vector C is based on DLog commitments [4] as C = ( C 0 = g a0 , C 1 = g a1 , C 2 = g a2 ) (mod p).
Step 1: L generates f (x), C , and su-secrets s i for each user U i , using ID i ; s i = f (ID i ) (mod q). The leader sends C and s i to each U i .
Round 2 -Reconstruction phase
Step 2: Each U i does verification of subsecret s i by using received commitment vector C . If s i is verified properly, it is sent to all other (n − 2) users by U i .
Step 3: The verification of subsecrets s i that are received from the other (n − 2) users is done by using C. This step has to be done by (n − 1) users for (n − 2) times, and hence the computational complexity is O(n 2 ) in this step of the protocol.
., n ) are indices of the participant and j, ( j = 0, . . ., t ) are indices of polynomial coefficients.
Step 4: Lagrange interpolation and common secret key establishment.
Each party U i has to construct polynomial f (x) from any ( t + 1 ) verified subsecrets s i , which are collected in set W i and then used in the following Lagrange interpolation formula:
IDj − IDi and then:
L i (0)s i (note that s = a 0 = f (0)) gives the common secret key.
This step is realized (n − 1) (t + 1) times, and then the complexity is here (n 2 ). The lower bound also is equal to Ω(n 2 ) due to t = ⌈ (n − 1) / 2 ⌉, so the complexity value θ ( n 2 ) is used in Tables 3 and 4 . Table 3 . Implementation results of GKD-based steps. 
GKD -protocol steps Computational cost (ms) Communication cost (bits)
GKD protocol steps with contributions as depicted in Figure 4
Step 1:
The L generates f (x) and C and s i as aforementioned in Section 3.5.1, Step 1. Before sending C and s i , L uses the ElGamal signature algorithm in order to sign the commitment vector.
L encrypts the calculated s i by using the receiver's public key Y i separately via the ElGamal encryption algorithm.
At the end of the Round 1, L sends each encrypted s i to each related U i via an open unsecure channel, accompanied with signature pair (sig 1 , sig 2 ) C of the commitment vector.
Round 2 -Reconstruction phase
Step 2: Each U i verifies the leader's signature, using the leader's public key Y L . 
., n are the indices of participants and j = 0, . . ., t are the indices of polynomial coefficients.
Step 4: Each party U i has to construct polynomial f (x) from any ( t + 1 ) verified subsecrets s i . Then the common secret key is established by using the Lagrange interpolation formula as explained in Step 4 of Section 3.5.1. Here, this step does not require additional security contribution.
Observations and efficiency analysis of GKD
Our results regarding the protocol implementations are available in Tables 3 and 4 .
• The computational overhead is a quadratic value with or without security contributions.
• Most of the computation costs of the protocol steps depend on not only the user number but also on the threshold value t . When user number increases, the size of t will increase and the computation overhead will become very costly. The counts of execution of encryption and decryption algorithms are n 2 .
• The proposed protocol is not proper for group key establishment protocol due to very costly communication overhead.
• Finally, round complexity is stable with only two rounds independent of user number.
• The protocol information is theoretically secure even when the adversary has unlimited computing power. Thus, the adversary simply does not have enough information to break the encryption unless he has ( t + 1 ) values [12, 13] .
Conclusion
Efficiency is quantified in terms of computation, communication, and round complexity. The experiments in the presented study are performed by using pairing-based cryptography with and without BLS signature scheme for GKA and VSS with and without ElGamal encryption and signature for GKD. The related efficiency analysis and their comparisons are summarized in Table 5 , and the following findings can be useful to choose and evaluate a group key establishment solution: Table 5 . Comparison of measured implementation results of protocol models.
Protocol models Without contributions -Costs With contributions -Costs Computation Communication Computation Communication
1. The proposed contribution of signature algorithms, usage of certification mechanisms to identify the group members, and encryption improves the reliability and robustness of the protocol and gives a chance to use it with open unsecure networks. Hence, the protocol has some prevention of passive and active adversaries with negligible overheads. Table 5 , computational complexity is linear for GKA and quadratic for GKD, which depends on the number of users in the group. The entity count, communication channel limits, and new participant addition or removal scenarios are the critical parameters to decide on the most suitable protocol model of GKE.
As depicted in
(a) The GKA protocol: The key issues for this model can be stated as follows:
• If any party establishes the wrong secret, he/she will be aware of the failure only when one of the participants encrypts messages with a wrong secret key and the recipient cannot decrypt it. In that case, the recipient sends an error message and the protocol restarts by picking a new ephemeral secret.
• Static participant number is an important drawback of the protocol. If a new participant would like to join a group, the protocol has to restart to regenerate a new common key. This can be accepted as an advantage or disadvantage according to protocol expectations, because the new user never knows the old secret key.
(b) The GKD protocol: The key issues for this model can be stated as follows:
• Consistency of the received messages can be verified via commitments; correctness is guaranteed this way and wrong secret sharing is impossible until the protocol is completed.
• If new party addition or removal occurs simultaneously in the same amount to/from the group during any round of the protocol, there is no any change in the subsecrets of old parties and the common secret s remains the same. However, if the number of entity additions and removals is not balanced, the subsecrets of old parties and the common secret s will change since the protocol starts with new (t, n) parameters.
3. In GKA, the communicating participants have equal contributions, but in GKD the leader is different from others.
4.
Certainly, there is a requirement to solve user count limits in groups for GKE protocols because every entity in an open unsecure network should be identified to securely communicate with each other as a closed group.
5. Furthermore, as a future study a formal security analysis of the protocol models with the proposed contributions is necessary to truly verify the approach.
